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COMMENT: FOREIGN WORKFORCE AND BANK
REFORM: CHANGING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LEVELS IN CHINA
Michael Chan
I. Introduction
Corporate governance is a problem in China. By attracting capital
and increasing exports, China has enjoyed positive economic growth in
recent history.1 These positive economic indicators, however, have
continued to grow despite China's lack of focus on corporate governance
issues.2 Chinese enterprises, whether State Owned Enterprises (SOEs),
privately held companies, or companies owned by both the state and other
private entities, have little short-term incentive to be financially
transparent.3 These entities largely receive operational funds in both the
equity and debt markets regardless of financial transparency levels.4
Economic growth, however, will not continue without corporate
governance reform. This note provides a brief discussion of Chinese
economic history, outlines the issues surrounding China 's corporate
governance problems, and finally articulates a two-tiered corporate
governance solution based on economic reform in a bank-centric economy
and human resource allocation utilizing foreign and local workforces.

1

See UNCTAD On-Line Handbook of Statistics, at http://www.unctad.org (Nov. 2,
2003).
2
See John H. Farrar, The New Financial Architecture and Effective Corporate
Governance, 33 INT'L LAW. 927, 944 (1999).
3
See Yuwa Wei, Seeking a Practicable Chinese Model of Corporate Governance, 10
MSU-DCL J. INT'L L . 393, 399 (2001).
4
Todd Kennith Ramey, China: Socialism Embraces Capitalism? An Oxymoron for the
Turn of the Century: A Study of the Restructuring of the Securities Markets and Banking
Industry in the People's Republic of China in an Effort to Increase Investment Capital, 20
HOUS. J. INT'L L . 451, 467 (1998); See also Jianbo Lou, China's Bank Non-Performing
Loan Problem: Seriousness and Causes, 34 INT'L LAW. 1147, 1148 (2000).
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II. Corporate Governance Problems
A. Foreign Direct Investment
China cannot sustain positive foreign direct investment (FDI)
growth if economic reforms to increase corporate governance levels do not
improve. FDI is important to any developing country because it represents
direct, long-term, non-passive investment in the economy from both
individuals and business entities. China has enjoyed positive FDI growth
in its industries despite inadequate financial disclosure. Total FDI in China
grew

from

approximately

US$12

billion

during

1979-1982

to

approximately US$37 billion by the end of 1993.5 China 's FDI consists
of FDI inflows and outflows.6 FDI inflows alone in China reached US$40
billion and US$46 billion in 2000 and 2001 respectively.7
8

currently one of the world's leading beneficiaries of FDI.

China is
In order to

continue FDI growth, China should initiate economic reforms and
implement human resource solutions to carry out a comprehensive plan.
B. China is Bank-Centric
1. Equity Markets: Not the Main Capital Source
Chinese entities were once able to raise capital in their domestic
stock markets and even in the United States equity markets.9 Capital
inflows remained strong despite a lack of transparent financials that made
valuations and earnings projections difficult, even for sophisticated
5

Todd Kennith Ramey, China: Socialism Embraces Capitalism? An Oxymoron for the
Turn of the Century: A Study of the Restructuring of the Securities Markets and Banking
Industry in the People's Republic of China in an Effort to Increase Investment Capital, 20
HOUS. J. INT'L L . 451, 460 (1998).
6
See Id. This note focuses on China's FDI inflows.
7
UNCTAD On-Line Handbook of Statistics, supra note 1.
8
Ramey, supra note 5.
9
This article refers to the capital and equity markets synonymously. The capital markets
consist of both stock and bond markets. This note, however, disregards the bond market
because most entities are not in a position to successfully issue their own debt in China's
current stage of economic development. In the bond market, entities can raise capital by
issuing their own debt in the bond market, essentially finding investors that will “buy”
their debt and effectively become their “lenders.”
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institutional investors.10 The current economy no longer affords Chinese
entities this luxury, yet there are exceptions. The entities that do use the
equity markets, however, raise capital without providing transparent
financial statements. When Chinese entities enlist on one of the major
United States stock exchanges, financial reporting standards are relaxed
due to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule changes in 1987
that permit United States exchanges to waive or modify certain listing
standards for foreign issuers in order to attract foreign companies to U.S.
equity markets.11

Thus, Chinese entities still have managed to raise

capital in the equity markets while providing relatively poor financial
statements.
This trend cannot continue if China wants the equity market to
become the major vehicle for FDI. Despite positive FDI growth, the equity
market is experiencing problems and requiring greater regulation that will
ultimately demand greater reporting transparency among both state-owned
and commercial Chinese entities.12 Although the capital markets will be
essential for raising investment capital in the long-term, equity markets are
at an early growth stage and currently represent a relatively small source
of total capital to Chinese industries.13

Financial transparency and

corporate governance must improve in order for Chinese entities to attract
capital to the equity or stock markets in the long-term, and to raise capital
in the debt market or from banks.

10

“Transparent financials” are financial statements such as income statements, balance
sheets, and cash flow statements that accurately reflect an entity's financial position.
11
Robert Todd Lang, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1515 (2002).
12
Ramey, supra note 5.
13
Id. at 459; Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory
Standards for the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan, 20 N.W. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 13 (1999).
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2. Debt Markets
While the equity or stock market may be the main source for
capital in the long-term, Chinese entities now primarily turn to the debt
markets.14 A bank-centric economy means that most Chinese entities raise
capital in the Chinese banking sector, while few depend on raising capital
in the United States or China capital markets.15 Therefore, if SOEs and
commercial entities are to obtain necessary funding, they will need to
implement a plan focusing on building a strong banking system that will
force them to offer transparent financials and increase levels of corporate
governance.
C. Non-Performing Loans
1. Bailout Cycles
State Owned Enterprises are the main lending beneficiaries of a
bank-centric economy and the primary contributors to China's nonperforming loan (NPL) problem.16

Banks continue to lend to SOEs

knowing that the PRC will bail them out, artificially supporting otherwise
failing companies.17

SOEs are not compelled to provide banks with

accurate financial statements because funding largely continues, regardless
of profitability or cash flow, at the direction of the People's Bank of China
(PBOC).18

China's bank bailout cycles are central to the corporate

governance problem. China should therefore focus on banking system

14

Jianbo Lou, China's Bank Non-Performing Loan Problem: Seriousness and Causes, 34
INT'L LAW. 1147, 1159 (2000).
15
Id.
16
Michael E. Burke, IV, Improving China's Bank Regulation to Avoid the Asian Bank
Contagion, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 86 (1999).
17
See id.
18
Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory Standards for
the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 20 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 12 (1999); The PBOC is the central bank of China since 1983 and
the lender of last resort for state-run banks.
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reform before stock market regulation to increase levels of corporate
governance.
Unfortunately, poor quality loan funding leads to highly leveraged
enterprises that commonly result in default.19 Such NPLs or loans that do
not generate sufficient revenue for the lender remain on the banks' balance
sheets and are written off only at the direction of the PBOC.20 Estimates of
NPL to total outstanding loan ratios among Chinese banks range from
thirty to sixty percent, one of the highest NPL levels in Asia.21 Economic
pressure to create assets through lending compels banks to fund poor
quality loans. The pressure to create a larger asset base is due to relatively
large amounts of bank deposits, which represent a liability on the balance
sheet.22
If a bank's loan portfolio cannot sustain the ratio of NPLs to
performing loans, the PBOC will bail out banks as well.23 The entire
banking system could break down if this cycle continues:
The accumulation of NPLs has historically been one of the direct
causes of bank failures. In the United States, loan losses dominated the
major bank failures from 1934 to 1983. The recent bankruptcy of China's
second largest international trust and investment corporation, Guangdong
International Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC), was more or less
due to the large amount of unrecoverable loans…. [I]t would not be
exaggerating to assert that if the creation of new NPLs cannot be

19

Lou, supra note 14, at 1162.
Id. at 1148.
21
Id.
22
Essentially, China banks have relatively high deposit levels upon which they must pay
depositors interest. Such deposits are bank liabilities. In turn, banks must fund loans to
generate revenue in order to offset the interest paid on deposits. Such loans are bank
assets.
23
Lou, supra note 14, at 1151.
20
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effectively curbed, the accumulating NPLs will eventually pull down the
state commercial banks and even the entire banking system in China.24
High NPL levels directly decrease bank profitability, lower
consumer confidence, and decrease export growth and FDI.25 Most NPLs
were created after the reform began, highlighting the deficiencies of the
reform.26
2. Monitoring and Enforcement
Lack of effective monitoring and enforcement contribute to the
NPL problem, hampering corporate governance.27 Reforms in the past
have not succeeded in large part because of the lack of monitoring and
enforcement regimes in place.28 China's current economic stage does not
afford it a reputable external auditing authority. Thus, internal
mechanisms within the banking sector will have to fulfill this function. It
is realistic for banks to perform the financial auditing function. This point
is later described.
D. Qualified Financial Underwriters
Obtaining the necessary personnel to successfully implement an
effective economic plan is crucial.29 Furthermore, the widespread need for
labor management apart from the banking industry has grown from the
rising friction between Chinese partners and foreign investors in equity
joint ventures.30 As equity joint ventures have grown, so has the conflict
between the participants, caused by the diametrically opposed goals of a
24

Id. at 1150.
Lou, supra note 14, at 1153.
26
Lou, supra note 20.
27
Zhongfei Zhou & Jingwei Li, In Search of Approaches to Improving Corporate
Governance in China's State-Owned Commercial Banks, 36 INT'L LAW. 215, 217 (1992).
28
Wei, supra note 2, at 414.
29
See Margaret L. H. Png, Equity Joint Ventures in The People's Republic of China:
Problems That Continue After More Than A Decade Under The Open Door Policy, 24
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 589, 590 (1992).
30
See id. at 589 (equity joint ventures provide a direct investment vehicle in which both
Chinese partners and foreign investors can simultaneously participate).
25
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planned economy versus the market economy. Friction between these joint
venture partners involves three labor management areas: 1) recruitment; 2)
dismissal; and 3) bureaucratic interference.31

The proposed solution

addresses the practical problems of recruitment and retention. China's
viewpoint that a foreign workforce may pose a threat to the Chinese
culture or economic system is also a concern.
III. Economic History
A. Early Reform
1. People's Bank of China
Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the People's Bank
of China (PBOC) were founded in 1948.32 The PBOC was China's only
bank, performing as a hybrid of a central bank and commercial bank.33
The PBOC was under highly centralized control, and banks that were
subsequently created performed passive roles similar to bookkeepers and
cashiers.34 China's financial system was outmoded and fragile from a
Western perspective, as all of China's banks were state-owned and
undercapitalized.35
SOEs.

Further, many of the loans issued were NPLs to

36

2. Specialized Banks
In 1978, economic reforms and open-door policies were initiated.37
The reformation of the PBOC into the Central Bank of China in 1983
reflected these new reforms. The PBOC became the lender of last resort,
31

Png, supra note 29, at 612.
Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Transforming China's Traditional Banking Systems Under the
New National Banking Laws, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479, 480 (1996).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 481.
35
Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory Standards for
the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 20 NW.
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 12 (1999).
36
Id.
37
Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63-FALL LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (2000).
32
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an official central bank and statutory body answerable only to the National
People's Congress (NPC), in an attempt to create a banking model similar
to the United States' Federal Reserve System.38

Subsequent to the

reformation of the PBOC, “the commercial lending business was separated
from the PBOC and [was] transferred to newly created ‘specialized
banks.'”39

China created four state-controlled commercial banks, or

specialized banks in the mid 1980s: the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of
China (BOC), and the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC).40
These specialized banks were labeled the “big four.”41 The organizational
principle of the financial system at that time was “unified leadership and
division of specialism. The overall financial system implement[ed] the
unified policy, plan and system which [was] stipulated by the State. Each
specialized bank [had] its special responsibility in its own field.”42
B. Reform in the 1990s
1. Policy Banks
In the 1980s, China's banking system simply consisted of a central
bank surrounded by specialized banks.43

Bank reform in the 1990s

attempted to build an efficient and autonomous banking system through
commercial banks.44

The Commercial Banking Law of the People's

Republic of China states that commercial banks should be supervised by
the central bank, and “should be operated under the principles of
efficiency, safety and liquidity.”45 In 1994, China enacted three reforms to

38

Qian, supra note 32, at 481.
Id.
40
Id. at 482.
41
Id. at 488.
42
See id.
43
See id. at 481.
44
See Qian, supra note 32, at 482.
45
Id. at 488.
39
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work towards bank commercialization: 1) reform its foreign exchange
control system; 2) open up banking industry to foreign participation,
allowing foreign partners to invest in financial institutions; and 3)
establish three policy banks, which provide “policy loans” that are usually
non-performing and thus are often not creditworthy for funding under
normal commercial bank standards.46
This discussion will focus on the third option previously
mentioned: the formation of policy banks, which are primarily responsible
for non-commercial, state-initiated, non-performing loans. The three
policy banks are: 1) the Import-Export Bank, which funds large stateinitiated trade deals; 2) the State Development Bank, which finances
infrastructure developments; and 3) the Agricultural Development Bank of
China, which finances agricultural procurement for rural development.47
In an effort to convert specialized banks into commercial banks, policy
banks release the specialized banks of their obligation to fund nonperforming policy loans typically used to finance SOEs and other
government projects.48 Policy banks therefore permit specialized banks to
concentrate on funding profitable commercial loans.49 Most specialized
banks have yet to be converted into commercial banks.50 China may
intend to convert the “big four” into commercial banks, yet this is not
viable in the short to intermediate term.51
Emergence of the three policy banks has, however, allowed
commercial banks to form; in addition to the three policy banks and the
46

Id. at 484.
Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory Standards for
the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, 20 NW.
J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 13 (1999).
48
See id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
For purposes of this note, short and intermediate term time frames are approximately
five and fifteen years respectively.
47
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“big four” specialized banks, ten commercial banks have formed as of
1995.52 Positive growth may continue as commercial banks concentrate
on profitable loans based on sound credit analysis.
2. The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China
The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China
(CBL), enacted in 1995, is a core piece of legislation that governs the
development of Chinese commercial banking.53

Commercial bank

development is guided by three principles outlined in the Commercial
Banking Law: efficiency, safety, and liquidity.54 The CBL notes that
operations should be independent from any external interference and
should rely on the following canons: 1) self-operation; 2) self-risk
management; 3) self-responsibility for profits or losses; and 4) selfrestraint.55 The CBL is the main legal instrument that aids commercial
bank formation.56
IV. Analysis
A. Interest Rate Reform
Banks receive their allocated lending quotas based on the
borrowing demands of their markets.57 Lending quotas are then balanced
against the banks' deposits.58 The problem, however, is that deposit levels
and lending demand do not always coincide. Banks that are deposit poor
must receive aid from the PBOC to fund loans.59 However, banks are
more often subjected to lending pressure based on relatively high levels of

52

Qian, supra note 32, at 484.
See id. at 488.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
William D. Holmes, China's Financial Reforms In The Global Market, 28 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 715, 720 (1997).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 721.
53
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deposits in relation to loans outstanding.60 Thus, the PRC should permit
the PBOC to give interest rate relief to banks with high deposit levels.
This interest rate subsidy would allow depositors to earn interest at
relatively higher rates, yet would allow banks to receive fund loans based
on prudent credit analysis without undue pressure to make sub-par loans.
Specifically, the PBOC should make partial interest payments to
depositors in order to relieve liquidity pressures in banks and reduce
vulnerability to market and credit risk. When banks receive deposits, they
must in turn make interest payments to depositors. Banks are therefore
under pressure to lend that same money out in order to create assets or
loans that offset such liabilities or deposits. Banks should have a “safety
net” only in regards to having large amounts of deposits. Chinese
government subsidies would reward banks for holding deposits by
relieving bank pressure to fund unnecessary low quality loans.61 This is
an intermediate term solution that would be phased out in the long-term.
B. Credit Autonomy with Central Bank Control
This proposal emphasizes enforcement of Article 7 of the CBL,
which is essential to increasing transparency levels among SOEs and
commercial enterprises. Article 7 states, “When engaging in credit
business, a commercial bank shall strictly examine the credibility of a
borrower and persist in extending loans against collateral in order to
ensure recalling loans on time.”62 Contrary to the theory that pure market
forces should lead China out of its economic difficulties, China will

60

Id.
In essence, such subsidies lower real interest rates that banks pay out to depositors.
62
The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 7, 1995.
61
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benefit by maintaining central control of banks through the PBOC, yet
giving commercial banks the autonomy to underwrite loans.63
Credit autonomy is key to commercial banking success. Nothing
will replace funded loans based on sound credit analysis; however, in the
event of non-performance, the collateral mentioned in Article 7 gives
banks recourse.64 Commercial banks should have the right to receive
compensation through this collateral in the event of default.65
Although commercial banks would have credit analysis autonomy,
bank management and establishment would be controlled by the PBOC as
stated in Article 11 of the CBL: “The establishment of a commercial bank
shall require the examination and approval of the People's Bank of
China.”66 In addition to establishment, the PBOC should have central
control over various aspects of operation. For instance, fund reserve
requirements among specialized, commercial and policy banks would be
determined by the PBOC.
C. No Bailout Provision
In addition to credit analysis autonomy, commercial banks must be
allowed to fail. If the PBOC artificially supports otherwise failing banks,
accounting transparency among its clients will not improve. A “no
bailout” provision should be enacted in the CBL.67 The PBOC should set
specific standards by which banks must abide in order to avoid
compulsory shut down, thus providing banks an incentive to demand
transparent financials from their clients.
63

The PBOC could still have macro-economic control over interest rates and other
monetary policy, yet would provide an environment where commercial banks could build
healthy loan portfolios.
64
See supra note 62; Collateral against a loan provides a guarantee that helps mitigate the
lender's risk in the event of default.
65
Qian, supra note 32, at 489.
66
The Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 11, 1995.
67
Chapter VII of the CBL offers provisions for takeover and termination, but does not
expressly provide parameters for mandatory bank failure.
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D. Emergence of Commercial Banks
Some believe that the “big four” should be transformed into
commercial banks.68 Commercial banks arising as the primary source of
debt financing is a creditable long-term goal, but the “big four” specialized
banks should not be transformed into commercial banks. Rather, new
commercial banks that target a particular market niche should develop.
Commercial banks should gradually take loan market share away from the
“big four,” reducing their prominence in the market over time.
E. Finding a Qualified Workforce
A balance of bank credit analysis autonomy and central bank
management control will provide the foundation for improved corporate
governance. Economic mechanisms such as a “no bailout” provision and
interest rate reform will allow the commercial bank industry will grow in a
healthy manner, leading to higher corporate governance among SOEs.
Implementing this economic plan, however, requires qualified personnel
to manage and perform the financial underwriting. Although cultural
barriers and the apprehension of hiring a foreign workforce exist, China
has a long-term interest in considering the proposal.
The proposed solution involves a combination of bank reform and
human resource allocation. Recruiting personnel from a qualified local
talent pool should be a long-term objective. Short and intermediate term
solutions are to obtain a qualified workforce. The recruitment solution
entails primarily hiring returnees. A secondary component of the solution
includes recruiting expatriates, while fostering an environment where local
workers can be hired and even trained within the long-term.

68

Qian, supra note 32, at 482.
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1. General Recruiting Options
China needs qualified financial underwriters and managers to
initiate economic reform. Due in part to tremendous foreign investment
growth over the last two decades, China has had difficulties hiring and
retaining qualified employees.69 In addition, friction within joint equity
ventures between Chinese partners and foreign investors increased as
foreign investment grew.70 As equity joint ventures have grown, so have
the conflicts between the participants, caused by the diametrically opposed
goals of a planned economy versus the market economy.71

China's

economic complexity as a large developing economy and cultural barriers
to accepting a foreign workforce contribute to this friction.72
Recruiting qualified professionals poses entirely different problems
from hiring low-cost, unskilled labor. China needs financial underwriters
at all levels, including executive management. The major challenges for
the PRC lie in finding qualified local talent, especially at managerial
levels, and in cultural assimilation for a newly hired foreign workforce,
particularly expatriates. Three general recruiting options are available: 1)
hire local workers and college graduates and provide on-the-job training;
2) hire “returnees”; and 3) hire expatriates.73 Returnees are local residents
who have studied and/or worked abroad who want to return to China.74
Expatriates are generally described as non-Chinese persons from the West

69

Ames Gross, Recruiting Professionals in Southeast Asia, 7 SUM INT'L HR J. 16 (1998).
(Publication page references are not available for this document.)
70
See Png, supra note 29, at 589. Joint equity ventures are enterprises owned jointly by
Chinese partners and foreign investors.
71
Png, supra note 29, at 589.
72
Mao-Chang Li, Legal Aspects of Labor Relations in China: Critical Issues for
International Investors, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 525 (1995).
73
See Gross, supra note 69; Ames Gross, Strategies for Successfully Recruiting Staff for
China, 5 FALL INT'L HR J. 41 (1996). (Publication page references are not available for
this document.)
74
See Gross, supra note 69.
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who work in China.75 The proposed recruiting and retention solution
implements variations of all three options.
2. Local Recruiting
Hiring local workers is not entirely viable in the short-term
because the pool of qualified skilled local workers is too small.76
Alternatively, companies may provide their employees with on-the-job
training to the relatively select few who display potential as financial
underwriters and managers. The drawback of such training, however, is
that once training is received, employees may switch to higher paying jobs
at other companies. In th77e past, poaching, or recruiting from other
regions that effectively “steal” employees away from a particular country,
has caused 20 to 30 percent annual employee turnover in Thailand's
finance and banking industry.78 China, however, can mitigate this risk by
implementing various employment programs to reduce turnover.79 Longterm employment contracts can be signed, but other benefit plans may be
more effective.80 For example, retirement benefit plans that are at least
partially company funded and vest after a certain period of time may
provide an incentive for workers to stay with their current employer.81
3. Returnees and Expatriates
Returnee and expatriate recruiting may offer China more highly
qualified skilled workers than local recruiting in the short-term, making a
combination of all three human resource options a practical solution for
75

Id. For purposes of this note, expatriates include Overseas Chinese who are hired to
work in the PRC. Overseas Chinese are ethnic Chinese who were born outside of, and
live in a country other than Mainland China, or who have acquired residency abroad.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Ames Gross, Strategies for Successfully Recruiting Staff for China, 5 FALL INT'L HR J.
41 (1996). (Publication page references are not available for this document.)
80
Id.
81
Id.
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the PRC. Hiring returnees or locals who have studied and/or worked
abroad and want to return to China, is another way to find qualified
candidates. Returnees may be more qualified than some of the local
workforce, while providing other advantages distinct to their group
classification. Unlike the majority of expatriates, returnees speak the local
language, tend to present less housing problems, and have fewer
difficulties meeting visa requirements.82

In addition, returnees who

studied in Hong Kong could arguably provide the strongest immediate
contribution as high quality candidates that could most easily assimilate to
China's culture. Hong Kong is regarded as foreign to the PRC.
Returnees, however, may have potential conflicts with local staff
over status issues.83 This problem is inapplicable to expatriates. Local
employees and returnees may compare and evaluate each other in a
manner that expatriates would not be subject to because they are not ethnic
Chinese.84

In addition, expatriates may have managerial skills that

returnees who have recently graduated from academia may not have.85
Both returnees and expatriates may be more expensive and often demand
more benefits than local workers.86 Similar to returnees, expatriate costs
for recruitment and retention compared with local workers is significantly
higher in terms of salary and other possible costs.87 Additional costs may
include expenses for cars, drivers, maids, club memberships, taxes and
placing their children in expensive international schools.88 Weighing all
factors, returnees are more desirable than expatriates.

82

See Gross, supra note 69.
Id. See Gross, supra note 79.
84
See Gross, supra note 69; Gross, supra note 79.
85
See Gross, supra note 69; Gross, supra note 79.
86
See Gross, supra note 69; Gross, supra note 79.
87
See Gross, supra note 69.
88
Id.
83
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4. Professional Foreign Recruiting
In fact, the financial premium that China could pay should extend
to projects that actively recruit Chinese students, particularly in the United
States. Such a proposed project can be compared to Indonesia 's home
placement program at Northeastern University in Boston called “Home
Country Placement.”89 Over 100 major U.S. and Indonesian companies
make daily requests to this center, matching inquiries with student
profiles, allowing Indonesian students in the U.S. to find employment in
their home country.90 Adopting a similar program in China would allow
the PRC to recruit among a pool of qualified graduates. In addition,
traditional search firms can be effective in finding mid to upper level
executives whether they are returnees or expatriates.91
Taxes also influence foreign recruiting. To encourage short-term
expatriate hiring, China should not levy taxes on these foreign workers or
the companies that hire them, a practice that other countries like Malaysia
and Indonesia follow.92 Such taxes should be unnecessary in the long run
because market forces alone should discourage companies from hiring too
many expatriates.
5. Cultural Challenges
It is in China's long-term economic interest to accept a foreign
workforce despite personality differences and possible perceived cultural
threats. The economic advantages to foreign recruitment outweigh the
cultural disadvantages. To some extent, it can be argued that financial
skills required for commercial bank underwriting transcends cultural
barriers. Further, proper credit analysis does not involve political
influence. In addition, local employees have much to learn from foreign
89
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workers. Returnees who studied in the U.S. may be familiar with both
Chinese and Western cultures and could provide an immediate
contribution.
Despite the advantage of multiculturalism, China may perceive
such employees as a cultural threat. China may fear that returnees and
expatriates would impose their views on labor rights, and assert rights to
assemble and form unions. This is a legitimate concern, but economic
demand for such workers supercede these obstacles. The reality is that
local employees have much to learn from foreign workers in this
specialized field.
China ought to refrain from implementing government regulations
stipulating that foreign workers may fill a skilled position only if there is
no comparably qualified local worker. Such legal provisions exist in
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.93 In a period during
which highly qualified workers are needed, China should be able to hire
well-qualified returnees rather than merely competent local workers.
Implementing such regulations may cause locals to view that foreigners
are taking their jobs. Again, economic necessity supercedes this concern.
6. Long Term Educational Investment: Key to Local Workforce
pects of local recruiting should be a major focus for China in the
banking sector. Heavy educational investment in China should mirror
some of the successful efforts in Southeast Asia to combat the shortage of
educated workers in that region.94

For instance, the Indonesian

government has received large World Bank loans to increase its
educational facilities.95 One loan for $164 million was granted to finance
education projects funding junior secondary education and to improve the
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quality and efficiency of Indonesian high schools and universities.96
Thailand has invested $415 million for a skills development plan to train
1.9 million workers and 24,390 instructors and to construct labor
development centers nationwide.97 In addition, Thailand has eased the
requirements for establishing a private high school or university, only
requiring that 80 percent of the students be Thai and that English be a
mandatory language.98 Long-term educational funding has been successful
in various other Asian regions, which suggests that funding in China could
be similarly successful.
Part of China's educational investment should include extending
scholarships to students in various technical fields involving financial
underwriting. A similar scholarship program has been administered in the
Philippines, where that country's Department of Science and Technology
offered 3,500 scholarships to Master's degree candidates in the fields of
science and mathematics.99
It is difficult to determine the long-term economic success of
certain projects, but quantifiable results are available. For example, in
Malaysia, the number of first degree candidates increased from 15,000 to
75,000 between 1975 and 1993.100 Progress monitoring challenges should
not, however, deter China from a long-term investment in building a major
quality education program. Economic complexity is greater in China's
large economy. Financial risks of long-term educational investment are
higher than in smaller economies, but opportunity costs for not
implementing an educational plan are even greater.
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V. The Solution
Long-term

objectives

are

addressed,

yet

short-term

and

intermediate term goals are mainly discussed. Thus, stock markets may be
a primary capital source in the long-term, but economic reform involving
the debt market is the key to improving corporate governance over the
next fifteen years. Further, the greatest source of human capital should
ultimately derive from local Chinese sources, yet short and intermediate
solutions primarily involve recruiting and retaining a qualified foreign
workforce.
Economically, China should focus on building a sufficient banking
system rather than its capital markets to improve corporate governance;
this however, is not a new idea.101 Further, economic reform to regulate
state enterprises through market forces and incentives instead of
inefficient central planning has been a common mantra as well.102 What is
novel is that the proposal allows the PBOC to maintain centralized control
over the banking industry while giving banks complete autonomy to
perform credit analysis and build their loan portfolios. For example, the
PBOC can subsidize interest rate payments to depositors in order to
provide interest rate relief to banks, while still allowing them to perform
credit analysis with complete autonomy. Also novel is the idea that
commercial monitoring problems can be resolved through bank demand
for financial transparency among its corporate clients. Monitoring would
take place as banks periodically analyze company financials during an
ongoing relationship with clients that maintain loans. Thus, there is no
immediate need for a third party to monitor or enforce corporate
governance activities within companies. Further, the PRC would let banks
101
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fail when loan portfolios could not sustain liabilities. Thus, company
enforcement to become transparent would not be a large issue. The risk of
bank failure compels entities to provide solid financial statements in order
to obtain and retain debt funding. Indeed, banks would no longer be able
to fund non-performing loans if they are allowed to fail. In turn, entities
would be permitted to fail under a “no bailout” provision in the CBL,
providing proper incentive to report accurate financial statements. Thus,
companies could not continue to obtain loans without being fully
financially transparent.
Recruiting and retaining qualified financial underwriters and
managers are among China's largest challenges. A qualified workforce is
necessary to implement complex financial underwriting. A short-term
primary goal of recruiting returnees with a secondary aim to employ
expatriates, and a long-term focus on cultivating a qualified local
workforce will fulfill China's human resource demands. Cultural
differences between local and foreign workers are not ignored. Financial
cost and complexity of building an educational program are also
recognized. Despite cultural and economic challenges, China has the longterm economic incentive to implement a foreign workforce.
VI. Conclusion
Attracting foreign capital is necessary for China's continued
economic growth. A major obstacle, however, is the lack of corporate
governance and accounting transparency in the PRC. China has had many
problems with the efficiency and effectiveness of its financial
regulation.103 Many proponents advocate a market discipline to allow the
free markets to solve China's financial woes.104
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market forces to operate freely is too drastic and unrealistic in the PRC.
The economic proposal is pragmatic. Additionally, recruiting highly
qualified underwriters from outside the People's Republic of China (PRC)
to perform complex, in-depth credit analysis, is a key component in
developing a comprehensive solution that allows commercial banks to
perform their own independent credit analysis while still maintaining
macro-economic control over the banking industry.
China is a developing country with tremendous societal and
economic potential. Government control, financial autonomy, and a
collaboration of human resources from neighboring regions and other
countries may help China solve their corporate governance problems.

